Contracts -- Antenuptial Agreements -- Public Policy by Friedman, Robert J.
University of Miami Law Review 
Volume 11 
Number 1 Miami Law Quarterly Article 13 
10-1-1956 
Contracts -- Antenuptial Agreements -- Public Policy 
Robert J. Friedman 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr 
Recommended Citation 
Robert J. Friedman, Contracts -- Antenuptial Agreements -- Public Policy, 11 U. Miami L. Rev. 143 (1956) 
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol11/iss1/13 
This Case Noted is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of Law 
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law Review by an authorized 





Defendants agreed to indemnify plaintiff for amounts spent in support
of defendants' pregnant sister as consideration for plaintiff's promise to
marry her. Subsequent to a divorce, which was anticipated in the agreement,
plaintiff sued to recover on the agreement. Held, the agreement was valid,
and plaintiff could recover. Kovier v. Vagenheim, -Mass.-, 130 N.E.2d
557 (1955).
The majority of jurisdictions do not favor antenuptial agreements which
have for their purpose or effect the facilitation of a future separation or
divorce.' Such agreements are against public policy2 and thcrefore void.3
These decisions reflect the interest of the public in the maintenance of the
family institution and relationship.4
Public policy demands that a husband be obliged to support his wife
and child. This obligation is considered an integral part of the marriage
contract, and the courts will not allow the obligation to be modified or
released by consent of the parties.6 The courts strictly interpret and declare
void agreements in which the wife agrees to support herself, even when
limited to temporary periods.7 Generally, it makes no difference if the
agreement is to be effective during the marriage or to become effective
upon separation or divorce. On this basis, agreements between husband
and wife which attempt to limit or relieve the husband's liability during
marriage to support his wife8 or step-children,9 and agreements which
1. Potter v. Potter, 101 Fla. 1199, 133 So. 94 (1931); Neddo v. Neddo, 56
Kan. 507, 44 Pac. 1 (1896); Cumming v. Cumming, 127 Va. 16, 102 S.E. 572
(1920); see also RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 1743 (1932); WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
§ 586 (rev. ed. 1936).
2. Oliver v. Wilder, 27 Colo. App. 337, 339, 149 Pac. 275, 277 (1915):
,... Public policy' being that rule of law which declares that no one can
lawfully do that which tends to injure the public or is detrimental to the public
good.
3. Cf. Bituminous Cas. Corp. %. Williams, 154 Fla. 191, 17 So.2d 98 (1944);
Billingsley v. Cleveland, 41 W.Va. 234, 244, 23 S.E. 812, 815 (1895).
4. Evans v. Harley, 57 Ga. App. 598, 196 S.E. (1938); Osborne v. Osborne.
197 S.W.2d 234 (Tenn. 1946).
5. In re Moser, 145 F.2d 523 (7th Cir. 1945); Berge v. Berge, 366 Ill. 228,
8 N.E.2d 623 (1937); In re Rhinelander's Estate, 290 N.Y. 31, 47 N.E. 2d 681
(1943).
6. Osborne v. Osborne, 197 S.W.2d 234 (Tenn. 1946).
7. Warner v. Warner, 235 Ill. 448, 85 N.E. 630 (1908); Kerschner v. Kersehner,
244 App. Div. 34, 278 N.Y.S. 501 (1st Dep't 1935), aff'd, 269 N.Y. 655, 200 N.E.
43 (1936) (only while husband was in medical school).
8. Warner v. Warner, supra note 7; Benjamin v. Benjamin, 197 Misc. 380,
95 N.Y.S.2d 167 (Sup. Ct, 1950); Hillman v. Hillman, 69 N.Y.S.2d 134 (Sup. Ct.
1947); Gregg v. Gregg, 133 Misc. 109, 231 N.Y.S. 211 (Sup. Ct. 1928).
9. Mengal v. Mengal, 201 Misc. 104, 103 N.Y.S.2d 992 (N.Y. Dom. Rel. Ct.
1951).
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
attempt to limit or relieve his liability in anticipation of divorce or separa-
ton are void. 10 In Florida the same result is achieved by virtue of statute."
Even if legitimazation of the child is the underlying motive, agreements
between husband and wife to allow the husband to obtain a divorce' 2 or
to negate his requirement to support the wife and child arc invalid.' 3 Tile
same result is reached where the agreement bctween the husband and the
girl's father makes the girl's father liable for support.' 4 A favorable view
is taken towards agreements in which the unmarried mother attempts to
have the husband,' his father,' his relatives,' 7 or his friends'8 guarantee
her support. The rationale is that if the husband fails to carry out his
obligation, such an agreement relieves the girl's family from support by
rendering another liable.
In the instant case the court relics upon Specht v. Richter' and \Wright
v Wright 20" In the Specht case, the paternity of the child could not be
ascertained. A blameless gentleman stepped forward to marry the girl, and
the court concluded that the magnanimity of the girl's father's agreement
to reimburse the husband for the support of his daughter and her child
was valid and not against public policy. These facts are distinguishable
from the present case where paternity was not in issue. In the Wright case,
the husband's father guarantecd to support the wife and child if the hus-
band failed to do so. This case can be classified with the cases mentioned
above wherein the wife contracts with somcone to guarantee the husband's
support, and is questionable authority for validating an agreement by the
wife's relatives to alleviate the husband's obligation.
Ail analysis of the Kovler case indicates the girl's family will still be
supporting the girl and her child, as if the marriage never took place, and
10. Williams v. Williams, 243 Pac. 402 (Ariz. 1926); Stefonick v. Stefonick,
167 P.2d 848 (Mont. 1946); Fricke v. Fricke, 257 Wis. 124, 42 N.W.2d 500 (1950);
Ryan v. Dockery, 134 Wis. 431, 114 N.W. 820 (1908). But see Atkins v. Atkins'
Adni'r, 203 Ky. 291, 262 S.W. 268 (1924) (antenuptial agreement providing that
wife be liable for her necessaries held valid).
11. FLA. Sr'rA'. § 708.10 (I) (1955). In allowing ,narried women to contract in
their own name, this section provides that the statute shall not be construed so as
to allow the wife to contract with hcr husband to relieve him from his duty of
support.
12. Safranski v. Safranski, 24 N.W.2d 834 (Minn. 1946); McLean v. McLean,
237 N.C. 122, 74 S.E.2d 320 (1953).
13. State v. Ransell, 41 Conn. 433 (1874); Campbell v. Moore, 189 S.C. 497,
1 S.E.2d 784 (1939); Cumming v. Cumming, 127 Va. 16, 102 S.E. 572 (1920).
14. Smith v. Smith, 154 Ga. 702, 115 S.E. 73 (1922).
15. W\yant v. Lesher, 23 Pa. 338 (1854) (husband placed bond with girl's father).
16. Bader v. Iliscox, 188 Iowa 986, 174 N.VV. 567 (1919) (husband's father
conveyed laud to wife as guarantee); Wright v. Wright, 114 Iowa 748, 87 N.W. 709
(1901) (husband's father agreed to support wife and child should husband fail to
do so.)
17. Armstrong v. Lesher, 43 Iowa 159 (1876) (A bond placed with wife, hus-
band's relatives being sureties).
18. Jangraw v. Perkins, 77 Vt. 375, 60 Atl. 385 (1905) (husband's friend
executes a mortgage in favor of wife).
19. 258 11. App. 22 (1930).
20. 114 Iowa 748, 87 N.V. 709 (1901).
CASENOTES
the fatber-husband will be free to divorce the girl at aly time without being
absolutely liable for her support. This is true despite the court's statement
that easing the financial burden of support does not facilitate divorce. -'
Neither should the court declare valid a void agreement because the agree-
mcnt was motivated by a desire to make the child lcgitimate. \Vith the
post-war rise of the divorcc rate,22 the best interests of society are not
served by a ruling which validates an agreement requiring the girl's family
to indemnify the husband for support of the girl.
ROBERT J. FRIEDMAN
CRIMINAL LAW-DEATH OF A CO-FELON-
FELONY-MURDER DOCTRINE
Defendant participated with the deceased in the commission of all
armed robbery. The victim of the robbery justifiably killed one of the
felons. Defendant was indicted for first degree murder for the death of
his co-felon. Held, a co-felon is guilty of murder where the victim of an
armed robbery justifiably kills the other felon. Commonwealth v. Thomas,
382 Pa. 639, 117 A.2d 205 (1955).
An involuntary killing occurring in consequence of an unlawful act
constitutes either murder or manslaughter, depending on the nature of
such act.1 Under the common law, a homicide committed in the perpetra-
tion or attempted perpetration of a felony is murder, though the killing
may have been involuntary or unintentional.- Today, all but three states
have by statute adopted the common law doctrine of felony-murder? Both
at common law and under statute, a necessary element in all murder cases
is malice, or intent to kill. 4 Where a homicide is committed in the perpe-
tration of a violent felony, the turpitude of the act supplies the element
of deliberate and premeditated malice. 5 In order to apply the felony-murder
21. See note 10 supra which indicates that better reasoned opinions consider that
easing the financial burden of support does facilitate divorce.
22. U.S. BUREAU Oi THEn CENSUS, STATISTIGAL ABSTRACT OF TIE UNITED STATES:
1955 (Seventy-sixth edition) 76 (1955).
1. Baker v. Commonwealth, 204 Ky. 420, 264 S.XV. 1069 (1924); State v. Werner,
144 [a. 380, 80 So. 596 (1919); Commonwealth v. Chance, 174 Mass. 245, 54 N.E. 551
(1899); State v. Schaeffer, 96 Ohio St. 215, 117 N.E. 220 (1917).
2. State v. Serna, 69 Ariz. 181, 211 P.2d 455 (1950); TIonage v. State, 182 Ark.
74, 30 S.W.2d 865 (1930); People v. Gilbert, 22 Cal.2d 522, P.2d 9 (1943); State v.
Rossi, 132 Conn. 39, 42 A.2d 354 (1945); Lynch v. State, 207 Ca. 325, 61 S.E.2d
495 (1950); People v. Weber, 401 111. 584, 83 N.E.2d 297 (1948); People v. Wright,
315 Mich. 81, 23 N.W.2d 213 (1946); Commonwealth v. Guida, 341 Pa. 305,
19 A.2d 98 (1941); State v. Best, 44 Wyo. 382, 12 P.2d 1110 (1932).
3. Kentucky, South Carolina, and Maine are the only jurisdictions not having
Felony-Murder Statutes.
4. Leavine v. State, 109 FlI. 447, 147 So. 897 (1933); State v. Rogers, 141
Neb. 6, 2 N.W.2d 529 (1942); State v. Barton, 5 Wash. 2d 234, 105 P.2d 63 (1940).
5. People v. Watson, 132 Cal. App.2d 70, 281 P.2d 564 (1955); State v. Garcia.
159 Neb. 571, 68 N.W.2d 151 (1955); 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *1599, "If
one shoots at A. and misses him, but kills B., this is murder, because of the previous
felonious intent, which the law transfers from one to the other."
